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CRIMINAL LAW-INDETERMINATE SENTENCE-DuE PROCEss
Petitioner brought an action for a writ of habeas corpus asking
release from prison where he was allegedly being illegally restrained.
The original conviction occurred in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the indictment,
but he later changed his plea to guilty upon being told by the court that
the sentence would be for only one year. The sentence by the court
was for one year as had been previously promised. In the case at bar,
the convicted petitioner claimed that he had been held over the period
of sentence. The state defended on the ground that every sentence under
Ohio Revised Code section 5145.01 is a general one unless it falls within
one of the exceptions. Counsel for the petitioner then argued that if the
state's defense was valid, the petitioner had been deprived of due proc-
ess of law -because he relied upon the representation of the trial court and
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. Held, petitioner remanded
to custody. R.C. 5145.01-if a sentence rendered happened to be for
a- definite term, it is not void but to be treated as a general one. In the
absence of coercion in entering a plea o guilty, it is done voluntarily and
is not a deprival of due process under Article 1, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution. In re Smith, 162 Ohio St. 58, 120 N.E. 2d 736 (1954).
An indeterminate sentence in criminal law is one which involves
fixing a minimum and a maximum term at the time of sentencing rather
than a single period of years. The parole system and indeterminate sen-
tences are usually thought of as complimentary phases of correctional
treatment. The indispensible preliminary to an intelligent appraisal of the
nature and workings of indeterminate sentence laws is an understanding of
what the aim of penal treatment ought to be. Indeterminate sentence law
in connection with parole permits the period of time necessary to accom-
plish such a physical, emotional, and mental rehabilitation that the parolee's
renewed freedom will no longer endanger the welfare of society.
There are two general types of indeterminate sentence laws, both
of which must be controlled by statute. (1) States in which statutory
sentences are controlling; for example, Ohio. Ohio Rev. Code §5145.01.
Here it is mandatory upon the court to give the accused the exact sen-
tence set out in the convicting statute. No discretion is given to either
the judge or jury. (2) States where the statutory range governs the
fixing of the sentence, either by the court or by the jury; for example,
Vermont. Vt. Stat. (1947), sec. 7932. The effect of the latter is to make
it discretionary to set any maximum or minimum within the limits set out
by statute. A sentence for a term less than the minimum prescribed by
statute is erroneous. Morris v. Clark, 156 Ga. 489, 119 S.E. 303 (1923).
This latter type of sentence has been criticized because it is possible for
the sentencing authority to set maximum and minimum terms substantially
equal in duration, thus minimizing the operational area of the parole
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system. There is a conflict in authority as to the validity of such a
sentence. In Jones v. State, 23 Ala. App. 384, 125-So. 898 (1930),
such a sentence was held to be invalid as being against the legislative intent,
but in State v. Davisson, 28 N.M. 653, 217 Pac. 240, cert. denied 267
U.S. 574 (1924), a like sentence was upheld.
Under the Ohio type of statute, conceding the sentence is general
and not void, the only time at which the petitioner may say his debt to the
state is satisfied as of right is at the expiration of the maximum period.
Ex parte Tischler, 127 Ohio St. 404, 188 N.E. 730 (1933). The
prisoner, therefore, has a remedial right only if and when he is held over
the maximum term. People v. Lumbley, 8 Cal. 2d 752, 68 P. 2d 354
(1937). The minimum sentence is merely a period at which, as a matter
of discretion and not right, the prisoner may be released to conclude his
sentence outside of confinement under supervision. Clarke v. State, 23
Ariz. 470, 204 Pac. 1032 (1922).
Upon the above principle, the case at bar follows Ex parte Thorpe,
66 Ohio App. 128, 32 N.E. 2d 571 (1941). However, in the principal
case an additional question was raised by the facts leading up to the
conviction. That is, assuming the sentence is general, it may still ie un-
constitutional as applied in this situation, as a denial of procedural due
process of law. A decision of a state supreme court construing state penal
statutes in such wise as to impose a heavier sentence than would be possible
under the construction advanced by the accused is not reviewable in the
United States Supreme Court as a denial of due process of law. Herbert
et al. v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926). The theory therefore, for a
due process violation, must be based on the trial court's representation
concerning the one year sentence, and the reliance by the petitioner to
his detriment. The cause of action in the present case did not arise until
parole was refused. In Ex parte Farrar, 74 Okla. Crim. 390, 126 P. 2d
545 (1942), it was held that where an accused was induced to plead
guilty by representations on the part of the assistant county attorney and
the trial judge that the accused was eligible for a suspended sentence,
whereas in fact, on account of a prior conviction, he was not eligible for
a suspended sentence, judgment revoking suspension of sentence on that
account was void and the accused was held to be imprisoned without due
process of law and entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The Oklahoma
court held that the plea of guilty entered by the petitioner was induced
by promises which could not lawfully be carried into execution, and a
plea of guilty thus obtained was contrary to the spirit of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution.
The Ohio Supreme Court said the petitioner was not compelled
to enter a plea of guilty, but according to the Oklahoma case, com-
pulsion is not necessary. The petitioner must only prove that he was
induced by promises to plead guilty to establish a good case of deprivation
of due process of law. The question thus arises whether Ohio recognizes
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confessions induced by promises in any situation. Why did not the Ohio
Supreme Court follow the precedent set out in cases where the induce-
ments and confessions were made prior to the trial? Confessions, to be
received as evidence in a criminal case, must appear to be free and
voluntary. A confession induced -by hope or fear excited in the mind
by representations or threats of anyone is not to be considered voluntary.
State v. Strong, 12 Ohio Dec. 701 (1902). Ohio does not follow the
English doctrine which restricts the operation of inducements solely to
those made by one in authority, but follow the rule, that if confessions are
induced by any one in the general public, they are inadmissible as evidence.
Brain v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532 (1897). However, in Spears v. State, 2
Ohio St. 583 (1825), it was held that if the confession is induced by one
in authority, there is a presumption of inadmissibility, but if made by any-
one else, it is mere evidence of inadmissibility. The Spears case, supra,
went on to say that confessions or disclosures made under any promise or
encouragement of any hope or fear are inadmissible. The court also an-
nounced that the knowledge of the prisoner as to the groundlessness of
the promise is highly irrelevant. The United States Supreme Court has
never passed upon the problem of induced promises to plead guilty either
prior to or at the trial. However, in the above cases, it is evident that
Ohio courts recognize induced promises to plead guilty prior to indictment,
so why did not they extend the doctrine to facts as alleged in the principal
case? As theoretical matter, it seems as though an inducement made by
the court, as in the principal case, should be of greater force and expected
to be relied upon to a greater degree then an inducement covered by the
Spears case. Either the Ohio courts should follow their theory of induced
confessions by promise in toto, or they should discard it altogether.
Since the petitioner alleged in his petition that there was a violation
of due process only under the Ohio Constitution, and not the federal, the
instant case is not reviewable either by certiorari or appeal by the United
States Supreme Court; however, if the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution had been pleaded in the alternative, jurisdiction may
have been gained in the case at bar. If the alternative remedy had been
pleaded, perhaps the Supreme Court would follow the theory set out in
Clemons v. U.S., 137 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1943). In that case, the
Assistant U.S. District Attorney gave the defendant definite assurance
that he would not be prosecuted for a felony but only for a misdemeanor,
but the judge sentenced him under the provisions of a felony statute.
The court said that the defendantand his counsel relied on the represen-
tation of the District Attorney; that without such assurance they might
have used greater diligence in preparation for trial and might have
employed equally different tactics during the course of the trial itself; and
that since they could not be sure just what would have been the course
of events, there was a denial of due process.
Since the Ohio Supreme Court is the final forum to which a state
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due process question may ,be taken, its judgment under the Ohio Consti-
tution is final. Had counsel for the petitioner pleaded the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, re-
versal might have been gained in the United States Supreme Court on
the theory of the Clemons case, supra. As far as the application of the
indeterminate sentence law to the facts, it is undoubtedly correct; how-
ever, the question of due process may have been decided otherwise, if
we look to cases from other jurisdictions or to the Ohio theory of con-
fessions induced by promises prior to the time that the case comes before
a court.
Martin S. Bogarad
EASEMENTS-COMMON DRIVEWAY-USED By Two OWNERS FOR
MORE THAN 21 YEARS-PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS ACQUIRED
Plaintiffs and defendants owned adjoining improved properties on
the south side of West Maple Street in North 'Canton, Ohio, plaintiffs'
property being the easterly [of the two] and defendants' the westerly of
the two properties. In 1924 or 1925, pursuant to an oral agreement
between the then owners, a joint drive complete with aprons was con-
structed leading to the garages in the rear of the lots, each owner paying
one-half the cost of construction. The original owners used the drive
until 1948, in which year both properties changed ownership. Difficulties
over the use of the driveway then arose and on July 26, 1951, the
plaintiffs, Shanks, commenced an action against the defendants, Floom,
asking for an injunction restraining defendants from using the drive and
that plaintiffs' title be quieted against any claim of the defendants. The
common pleas court denied the injunction. The court of appeals quieted
title of plaintiffs as to the west line of their property and held that both
properties were subject to an easement for driveway purposes by reason
of more than 21 years of adverse use. Held, the majority opinion of the
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Shanks v.
Floom, 162 Ohio St. 479, 124 N.E. 2d 416 (1955).
Whether the use of the driveway was permissive only and thus not
ripening into an easement or was a use under a claim of right which would
ripen into an easement by prescription was before the supreme court for
the first time. The court held, "the nature and permanence of the im-
provement, that it was constructed of concrete, and that it was constructed
on what the owners considered to be the boundary line between their
properties, are more consistent with a claim of right on the part of each
owner than with a day-to-day permissive use." The court quoted with
approval from two cases in which the facts were identical with the facts
in the instant case. In the first case, Rubinstein v. Turk, 29 Ohio Law
Abs. 653 (1939), the court of appeals said, "the possession and use by each
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owner was under a claim of right and therefore adverse. This adverse
possession continued for more than 21 years and therefore ripened into a
prescriptive right." In the other case, Johnson v. Whelan, 171 Okla. 243,
42 P. 2d 882, 92 ALR 1096 (1935), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
held as follows: "While the mere permissive use of a way over the land
of another will not ripen into an easement, yet one who joins his adjacent
landowner in the construction of a paved private way over and along the
medial line, has given such adjacent owner more than a mere license.
Each owner, by the use of the driveway, is continuously asserting an
adverse right in the portion of the way on the other's lot. And from
such use for 15 years the law raises a presumption of the grant of an ease-
ment." In Ohio, this adverse use must, of course, be for 21 years.
The minority opinion in the principal case contended that there was
nothing hostile nor adverse in the creation of the driveway or in its sub-
sequent use. There was merely created a revocable parol license. At-
tention was called to certain Michigan and Illinois cases referred to in the
majority opinion. In Wilkinson v. Hutzel, 142 Mich. 674, 106 N.W.
207 (1906), the court stated, "An acquiescence for a long period of years
between adjoining owners in such mutual user of a way would not create
title in and to the land of the other in either party for the reason that
there is nothing hostile or adverse in such user." Again in Banach v.
Lawera, 330 Mich. 436, 47 N.W. 2d 679 (1951), the court said, "a
prescriptive easement with respect to a joint driveway does not arise out of
mutual use of the driveway until mutuality ends and adverse use com-
mences and continues for the period essential to the fastening of such
right. If use of a joint driveway was permissive at inception, such per-
missive character will continue of the same nature, and no adverse use
can arise until there is a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to
the owner and brought home to him." The Illinois court in Lang v.
Dupuis, 382 Ill. 101, 46 N.E. 2d 21 (1943), stated, "where adjoining
owners constructed a driveway on a lot line under an oral agreement and
without stating how long the driveway should be used as such, and owners
and their successors used the driveway for more than 20 years the first
owner's successor obtained no easement by perscription on the portion of
the driveway on the lot of the second owner's successor, and had merely
a revocable license to use the driveway."
The minority opinion also cites the case of Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v.
Donovan, 111 Ohio St. 341, 145 N.E. 479 (1924) which held, "an
easement by prescription may be acquired by open, notorious, continuous,
adverse use for a period of 21 years. Such use never ripens into a pre-
scriptive right unless the use is adverse and not merely permissive." It
must be noted on this point that the defendant conceded "that if their use
of the driveway, and that of their predecessors in title, pursuant to this
agreement, was permissive only such use under the law of Ohio could
not ripen into an easement.!
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The writer believes that the bete noire of these cases is the inter-
pretation placed on the word, hostile, which in its commonly accepted
definition, means having or showing ill-will, inimical or unfriendly. It
was well said in Kimball v. Inderson, 125 Ohio St. 241, 181 N.E. 17
(1932), "to establish hostility it is not necessary to show that there was a
heated controversy or a manifestation of ill will, or that the claimant was
in any sense an enemy of the servient estate; ... it is sufficient if the use is
inconsistent with the rights of the title owner and not subordinate or
subservient thereto." The court further says "that hostile use is some-
times described as possession and use under a claim of right."
It is to be noted that the court of appeals in the instant case, affirmed
by the supreme court, quieted plaintiffs' title as to the west line of their
property, but held that both properties were subject to an easement for
driveway purposes. This is entirely consonant with the authorities and
underlines the distinction between title by adverse possession and title to
an easement by prescription: that to establish title by adverse possession,
the use of the land by the claimant must be exclusive; to acquire an ease-
ment by prescription as in the instant case, the use need not be and indeed
was not exclusive. Both plaintiffs and defendants used all of the driveway.
However, defendants' use of the driveway was open, continuous and
adverse for a period of 21 years or more, consequently the defendants
prevailed.
The weight of authority is in agreement with Johnson v. Whelan,
supra, and, supports the majority opinion in the instant case, in their
holdings that a parol agreement, though void under the statute of frauds,
will, if followed by use for the period of prescription, establish a pre-
scriptive right to an easement.
John F. McCarthy
LABOR LAW: STATES' RIGHTS AND FEDERAL SUPERCEDURE
-JURISDICTION OVER STRANGER PICKETING
Petitioner, a Pennsylvania corporation doing a portion of its inter-
state business in Ohio, sought an injunction in an Ohio Common Pleas
Court to enjoin a labor union from picketing the company's Ohio place
of business. The corporation's employees were not affiliated with any
labor group. The Court of Common Pleas granted the relief sought upon
a finding that the union's picket practice violated state law in that it
sought to coerce an employer to influence his employees regarding their
choice of a bargaining agent. The Supreme Court of Ohio, affirming
an Ohio Court of Appeals, held the state courts to be without jurisdiction
of the subject matter since, under federal supremacy doctrine, exclusive
jurisdiction was thought to be vested exclusively with the NLRB.
Grimes and Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock, 163 Ohio St. 372,--N.E.-2d
(1955).
State power in labor disputes involving stranger picketing has long
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been hedged with qualifications. A comparatively early case declared a
state powerless to enjoin picketing solely on the ground that the partic-
ipants were strangers to the employment relation. American Federation
of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). States did, for a time however,
enjoy rather extensive jurisdictional perogative in the field-it being
correctly assumed that if a union's activities were neither protected nor
prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act, a local forum might be
had. Brown-Saltman Co. v. Furniture Workers Local 576, 26 L.R.R.M.
2552 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1950); State ex rel Tidewater Shaver Barge
Lines v. Dobson, 195 Ore.533, 245 P. 2d 903 (1952). Stranger picket-
ing not having been mentioned, eo nomine, in the federal legislation, the
states displayed little reticence in exercising control. Where violence
threatened on the picket line or where an employer sought damages for
property destruction, local jurists acted without a discernible qualm.
Hearn Department Stores, Inc. v. Livingston, 282 App. Div. 480, 125
N.Y.S. 2d 187 (1953); Lodge Manufacturing Co. v. Gilbert, 195
Tenn. 403, 260 S.W. 2d 154 (1953); Benton v. Painters Local No.
333, 263 P. 2d 854 (Cal. App. 1953). Their right so to do was dearly
recognized iby Allen-Bradley Local No. 111 v. Wisconsin Labor Board,
315 U.S. 740 (1942).
Nor did state courts exhibit measurable compunction where labor
was thought to have contravened state economic policy. Coercive union
attempts to circumvent state anti-trust policy were designated locally con-
trollable. Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
And the states went further to assume injunction power where labor al-
legedly sought to coerce employers to bring influence to bear upon their
employees in organization disputes. Chic Maid Hat Manufacturing Co.
v. Korba, 32 L.R.R.M. 2105 (N.Y.. App. Div. 4th Dept. 1953);
Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951);
Union News Co. v. Davis, 201 Misc. 1062, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 554
(1951); Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 362 Mo. 375, 241
S.W. 2d 886 (1951). On facts equivalent to the instant case the issuance
of an injunction was held authorized by Ohio law in Richmanr Brothers
Co. v. Clothink Workers of America, 116 N.E. 2d 60 (Ohio C.P.
1953).
Supplying the ultimate requisite judicial sanction for such juris-
dictional base, the Supreme Court in Building Service Employees v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950), indicated that state standards of "unlaw-
ful" union picketing could be applied in situations like the Riclman
dispute, supra. At least one post-Gazzam state adjudication resulted in
an injunction against abusive picketing notwithstanding that the dispute
was then pending beforl the NLRB. Huff Truck Lines v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local No. 270, 30 L.R.R.M.
2571 ((La. Par. Ct. 1952). Implicit in decisions like Huff, supra, was
the notion that union practices at variance with local policy ought not to
remain ungoverned in the absence of affirmative federal action.
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But the high Court limited the area for application of state policy
in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local No. 276, 346
U.S. 485 (1953), wherein the rule was enunciated that local courts are
impotent to enjoin coercive stranger picketing if it falls within the reach
of the National Labor Relations Act. From an examination of the text,
it would seem manifest that the jurisdiction of the NLRB pre-empts
and excludes all others for the sake of national uniformity. Thus the
Court by approaching the problem from a jurisdictional vantage point
largely obliterated the state's ,ight victory as posited in the Gazzam
opinion, supra. Whether this result stems from a determination that
such picketing is protected under federal law or, conversely, from a char-
acterization of the picketing as prohibited, is not abundantly clear. The
distinction is not here relevant, however, since a finding of either would
be dispositive of the case. Amalgamated Association of Street Railway
Employees v. Wisconsin Labor Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
Post-Garner state and federal opinions have, with few exceptions,
acquiesced in the Supreme Court policy, even abnegating power where
neither party has sought NLRB relief. Brouoiqng v. King Co.,
34 N.J. Super. 13, 111 A. 2d 415 (1954); Bert Manufacturing Co. v.
Local 810, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 805 (1954); Lock Joint Pipe Co. v.
Anderson, 127 F. Supp. 692 (1955); Richman Brothers v. Clothing
Workers, 36 L.R.R.M. 2320 (Ohio C.P. 1955); Copper Transport Co.
v. Stufflebeam, 36 L.R.R.M. 2433 (Mo. 1955). The instant case fits
concisely into this category. Taken in conjunction with the Garner
rationale, these cases elicit at least three provocative queries: 1. Is a state
tribunal to be ousted of jurisdiction. although the NLRB has previously
declined jurisdiction of the particular litigation? 2. If a state court chooses
to ignore the Garner doctrine what remedies are available to the parties?
3. And what of the violence and damage-action situations?
Answering these questions in reverse order, we find the Court has
made abundantly clear the proposition that damages may yet be had,
via state judicial process, from an overly exhuberant union. United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954). As to
violence cases, post-Garner decisions have continued to assert local and
federal jurisdiction, nor can any reason be perceived why this should not
be so. Irving Subway and Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671
(1953); Perez v. Trifiletti, 74 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied
348 U.S. 926; Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972,
74 So. 2d 182 (1954); Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v.
Automobile Workers, 36 L.R.R.M. 2109 (Wisc. 1955); Driver's Union
v. Jax Beer Co., 36 L.R.R.M. 2188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); McQuay,
Inc. v. Automobile Workers, 36 L.R.R.M. 2446 (Minn. 1955).
In regard to question 2 supra, where no violence is imminent and
the case falls within the purview of the Garner rule but a hyper-provincial
tribunal chooses to ignore its lack of jurisdiction the litigants can, of
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course, traverse the traditional appeal route to the highest court in the
land. But can they obtain a federal court injunction pende lite? In
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Brothers,
348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court answered this question in the negative
by sustaining a Federal District Court's disinclination to enjoin an Ohio
court where the Garner doctrine was clearly applicable. The court noted
what has never been questioned: Federal courts are here as barren of
subject matter jurisdiction as any state court-hence the rule is inapplicable
which states that federal judges may, irt conjunction with exercise of
their own jurisdiction, enjoin their judicial counterparts on the state level.
See Capital Sersice, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 501 (1954). The
Court held in the Richman case that relief could be had only at the behest
of the NLRB but sought to assuage the losers by hinting that the
employer's original action in seeking the state injunction might of itself
be an unfair labor practice. In the Matter of W. T. Carter and Brother,
90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950).
The problem of state judicial power where the NLRB has de-
clined jurisdiction of a particular dispute, as raised in question 1. supra,
is more difficult of solution. One may argue with some force that state
power ought, theoretically, to be denied despite a prior refusal of the
Board to assert its power. The argument would be something like this:
Once stranger picketing ceases to ,be conceived of as outside the pale of
the National Labor Relations Act it must, of logical necessity, be categor-
ized as either protected or prohibited. As such it can only be dealt with
by the NLRB. Therefore inaction by the Board is not pertinent to the
jurisdiction problem. The chief difficulty with such a solution is that a
recent Federal District Court decision rejects it. In N.L.R.B. v. Swift
and Co., 36 L.R.R.M. 2087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. East. Dist. Mo. 1955)
the Board was denied an injunction against state action in a case involving
peaceful stranger picketing. The reason given for the refusal was the
validity of state jurisdiction which was thought to obtain since the Board
had previously refused to hear the employer's complaint. This decision
assumes two things: 1. The Board's refusal to act indicates a neutral
position. 2. In the absence of Federal action the states must be permitted
to assert their power. In answer to the first contention it would seem
patent that the Board's attempt to enjoin state action shows that it's
original refusal to entertain the employer's grievance constituted a tacit
sanction of the union's activity. Even were this not true, unformity of
result is not obtained by permitting state action in thp absence of NLRB
activity. The rationale of the Garner case was uniformity of result;
if the Board wishes to sanction stranger, picketing then state courts ought
to be compelled to step aside. It is submitted that the Swift opinion is out
of harmony with Supreme Court policy and ought not be permitted to
stand.
Indeed, the Court has already denied, on Garner theory, state
jurisdiction under similar circumstances in the related field of strike
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policy. Weber v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955). There
the NLRB declining to classify a strike as an unfair labor practice
under section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Taft Hartley Act, accordingly dis-
missed the action; the Supreme Court struck down a subsequent state
injunction since, said the high court, the NLRB tight have found the
union activity either protected or prohibited under another section of the
act. (emphasis supplied) Such a disposition is tantamount to holding that
if in fact a litigant's practices fall within the confines of the federal act,
the state has no jurisdiction; action or inaction by the NLRB is there-
fore irrelevant.
This much, then, would appear true: Where the issue is stranger
picketing of an interstate business and the essence of the complaint appears
to be union conduct amounting to an unfair labor practice, sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter rests with the NLRB.
To this we need add but one caveat viz: States may still proscribe violence
and property damage. Such a national policy may be thought, by some
states' rights advocates, to be unsatisfactory; but this is not the first in-
stance in which parochial policy has been superseded in the name of
interstate considerations.
William Franklin Sherman
PUNITIVE DAMAGEs-FRAUD IN THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE
Plaintiff when examining defendant's house and property with a
view to purchase inquired as to water supply. Defendant assured him of
an abundant supply of water. After plaintiff occupied the house for ap-
proximately thirty days, he found the well did not have sufficient capacity
and had to drill another well. There was some evidence that defendant
previously had trouble with the water supply and wished to sell the
house because of that difficulty. The issue of compensatory and punitive
damages for fraud was submitted to the jury and a general verdict was
returned for plaintiff. On appeal, held affirmed. The jury may award
punitive damages in a tort action -based upon sale of real property where
the sale was induced by fraud which was motivated by "actual malice."
Waters v. Novak, 94 Ohio App. 347, 115 N.E. 2d 420 (1953).
The principle that only actual damages are allowed for breach of
contract unless the law provides for the award of punitive damages was
relied upon 'by the dissenting judge in the principal case. Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning Institute v. Rine, 80 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E. 2d
473 (1946). The dissenting judge felt that even though the plaintiff's
petition sounded in tort, the operative facts sounded in contract, and Ohio
has held that there can be no allowance of punitive damages in an action
brought for breach of contract. Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372,
136 N.E. 145 (1922). The Ketchea case was based upon contract and
a malicious breach alleged. The court there said, "This malice does not
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change the action from one ex contractu to one ex delicto." This follows
the general rule that although the facts. may reveal a tortious act, if the
action proceeds on a contract theory, no punitive damages are allowable.
North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894); 17 C. J.,
Damages §272.
However, in the principal case, the plaintiff's cause of action did
not arise out of the deed, but out of the fraud between the parties before
the deed was executed. Taylor v. Leith, 26 Ohio St. 428 (1875). The
plaintiff could not have shown the vendor's material misrepresentation to
vary the terms of the written contract or deed, but only to show that it
induced the plaintiff to enter into the contract. Drew v. Christopher
Construction Co., 140 Ohio St. 1, 41 N.E. 2d 1018 (1942). A tort
action has thus been permitted against the seller of merchandise and
punitive damages allowed where the sale was induced by fraud. Saberton
v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E. 2d 224 (1946). Thus the
rule has evolved in Ohio that punitive damages may be recovered for a
tort committed in connection with, but independently of, the breach of
contract. Saberton v. Grdenwald, supra; Armstrong v. Fedhaus, Sr.,
87 Ohio App. 75, 93 N.E. 2d 776 (1950).
Other jurisdictions have expressed the rule similarly that punitive
damages may be recovered in a tort action even though the tort incidentally
involves a breach of contract. Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674,
117 P. 2d 331 (1941). For example, turning back the speedometer on
a secondhand car before selling it was held to be fraud for which punitive
damages may be awarded. Jones v. West Side Buick Auto Co., 231 Mo.
App. 187, 93 S.W. 2d 1083 (1936). Some jurisdictions have stated the
rule even more broadly so that punitive damages may be recovered for
breach of contract where the breach is attended by such gross negligence
or willful wrong as to amount to a tort, D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v.
Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770 (1944); noted 151 A.L.R. 631
(1944); or where a fraudulent act accompanies the breach, Davis &
Clanton v. C. I. T. Corp., 190 S.C. 151, 2 S.E. 2d 382 (1939);
Prince v. State Mutual Life Insurance Co., 77 S.C, 187 55 S.E. 766
(1907).
The principal case does not relax the existing rule in Ohio that
'"bare fraud" without actual malice is insufficient for punitive damages,
Cable v. Bowlus, 21 O.C.C. 53, 11 O.C.D. 526, aff'd without opinion
69 Ohio St. 563, 70 N.E. 1115 (1903); 13 0. Jur., Damages §139.
The principal case does, however, add to the existing law the idea that
punitive damages can be awarded for fraudulent sale of real property
when the action proceeds in tort. The case offers a warning, also. It points
up the fact that a petition should be drawn clearly to sound in tort if
punitive damages are to be requested; otherwise, the court may say breach
of contract and only compensatory damages are possible.
William F. McKee
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RIGHT OF PRESS To BE PRESENT DURING CRIMINAL TRIAL
On February 11, 1955 respondent, Judge of the Common Pleas
Court, Cuyahoga County was conducting the trial of State v. Baker et al.,
on an indictment of pandering. Before cross-examination of a state's
witness, counsel for the accused requested that his client's right to a
public trial be waived during the remainder of the witness' testimony
because counsel would "better be able to compel the witness to tell the
truth" if she could be examined in private. Respondent then excluded the
general public, including newsmen employed by the relators, from the
courtroom during the remainder of this witness' testimony. Within this
interval only the parties directly concerned with the case remained. A
record of this testimony was made available to the public as soon as
possible.
Relators, several Cleveland newspaper publishers, immediately sought
a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals to forbid respondent's future
exclusion of any of relators' reporters as well as the general public from
the Cuyahoga County criminal court and to strike from the record the
order issued by respondent on February 11. Held. Granted that the
guarantee of a public trial is for the accused's benefit, such right does
not guarantee the accused a private trial as against the public whose
interests are equally involved in the judicious administration of the law.
Writ allowed. E. W. Scripps Co. et al. v. Parker Fulton, 97 Ohio App.
125 N.E. 2nd 896 (1955).
Not only is this a case of first impression in Ohio, it is also the
second reported decision on this subject in the United States. The first,
United Press Associations et al. v. Francis L. Valente 308 N. Y. 71
123 N.E. 2nd 777, decided only two months before Scripps Co. v. Fulton,
supra reached a result contra to the Ohio case. The cases cannot be dis-
tinguished on the facts or on the status of the two states. True there
are factual differences in the cases but actually these differences would
seem to present a much stronger argument for the press' position in U.P.
Associations v. Valente supra than in Scripps v. Fulton supra. In the
former case, the judge excluded the public and press from the trial on his
own motion on the ground that public decency compelled his action. The
accused not only did not waive his right to a public trial but later secured
a reversal of his first trial because of the sweeping exclusion. People v.
Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. 2d 769 (1955). Further the record of
the Jelke trial was never available to the public or press. However, the
New York Court denied the press associations' application to restrain
Valente from enforcing his order on the ground that this action did not
deprive the press of any right of which they could complain.
There are differences also in the statutory bases of the public trial
guarantee in New York and Ohio. Article I section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution provides that "all courts shall be open" and Article I sec-
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tion 10 grants the accused the right of public trial. In New York there
is no constitutional protection but public trial is granted the accused by
N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §8 and N. Y. CivI. RIGHTS LAW §12 while
the more broadly worded -judiciary law section 4 declares that with
certain exceptions-divorce upon adultery, seduction etc.-"the sittings
of every court within this state shall be public and every citizen may
freely attend the same." Ohio law contains no exceptions such as those
found in New York; hence if U.P. Associations v. Valente supra had been
predicated on these exceptions, as it might possibly have been, see con-
curring opinion Desmond J., reconciliation of the two cases would be
much easier. But the majority opinion in U.P. A4ssociations v. Valente,
supra expressly disavows reliance on the exception clause of section 4.
If the contradictory results of the two cases cannot be ascribed to
factual or statutory differences, neither can they be explained by diverging
views on the scope of the 1st Amendment. The New York court was
unanimous in excluding any application of freedom of speech or press
to their case and the majority in Scripps v. Fulton, supra uses much the
same language. To understand these two cases then it is necessary to
look beyord facts, statutes or constitutions and to examine the varying
concepts of the scope of the public trial guarantee, first as they concern
the right of the accused and then as they concern-the right if any, of
the public, 156 A.L.R. 257, 14 Am. Juris §139-143.
There are a number of reasons for the long standing disagreement of
the courts as to the meaning of the guarantee. The fact that the origin
of the protection is obscure is partially responsible. See, The Accused's
Right To a Public Trial 49 COLUM. L. REv. 111 (1949), Radin, The
Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381 (1932). Then too, although
the supreme court has held the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment to include the right of public trial for the accused, In Re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1947), it has not yet had an opportunity to give an analysis
of the exact extent of the guarantee. The state courts therefore are pri-
marily concerned with the interpretation of their own constitutions and
statutes. And, although all states except two make some provision for the
guarantee within their laws, by implication or otherwise, the bare language
of the provisions is of little help in resolving the ,argument.
Happily, however, there are a few areas where all courts agree. A
public trial for the accused does not mean that the courtroom must always
be open to all who wish to attend. The general public need only be
admitted up to the limited capacity of the courtroom. Commonwealth v.
Trinkle, 294 Pa. 564, 124 A&L 191 (1924); Stat v. Hensley 75 Ohio
St. 255, 263, 79 N.E. 462,463 (1906); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1835
(2d ed. 1923). To keep order a judge may exclude unruly spectators,
People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894). (If there is
a threat of rescue of the accused, ticketed admission to the courtroom is
permissible. Pierpont v. State, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264 (1934),
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petition in error dismissed 128 Ohio St. 572, 192 N.E. 740 (1934).)
In obscene cases the court is generally free to exclude the young, State
v. Hensley, supra. See COOLEY, CON STrrUTIONAL LIMrrATIoNs, 380
(5th ed.). Some states even have statutes expressly allowing such exclusion.
See 44 COLUM. L. REv. 112. Where a child witness is unable to testify
dearly -before an audience, the court may temporarily exclude the spec-
tators. Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W. 2nd 931 (1935).
On the other hand, most courts agree that a public trial for the
accused means the presence of someone other than court officers, parties,
counsel, witnesses, jurors and friends. People v. Hartman, supra, People
v. Jelke, supra. The conflict between the courts arises in deciding how
many spectators must be present and how they are to be selected. Those
courts more scrupulous in protecting the accused's right define "public"
trial broadly as one in which the courtroom is to be kept open with all
classes of spectators admitted. State v. Hensley, supra. If the accused is
not given this kind of trial, these courts regard his right as violated even
though no prejudice may be shown, Fields v. State, 4 N.P. (N.S.) 401,
17 O.D. 16 (1906) and may even decide his right has not be waived
although he failed to -object to the exclusion in the court below. State v.
Hensley, supra.
Other courts are less vigorous in interpreting the accused's right.
To them a "public" trial is simply one which is not secret and the re-
quirement is satisfied when specified classes of spectators are admitted,
although the general public is excluded. Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437,
60 So. 118 (1912), People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 75, 64 N.Y.S. 433.
(1900) For reversal the accused must show actual prejudice by the ex-
clusion. State v. Nyphus, 19 N.D. 326, 12 N.W. 71 (1909) and the
right may be waived by failure to make timely objection. State v'. Smith,
90 Utah 482, 62 P. 2nd 110 (1936). People v. Miller, 258 N.Y. 54,
177 N.E. 306 (1931). Moreover in many of these states stautes ex-
pressly allow the judge to bar spectators in certain types of salacious
cases. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §4.
Of course, individual decisions will always be influenced by the
reasons for the exclusion, its duration and the extent of the exclusion.
However, an analysis of existing cases would seem to place the courts
of Ohio among those more scrupulous and the courts of New York among
those less concerned with the guarantee, although much of the language
of People vu. lelke, supra may reflect a trend toward a broader interpre-
tation.
Those courts which place more value on the right of the accused
are also more prone to recognize a corresponding right in the public to be
admitted. People v. Hartman, supra. In contrast, jurisdictions which
give the accused's right less importance deny the public any interest beyond
that which can be safeguarded by the accused. Moore v. State 151 Ga.
648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921). Ironically one result of this recognition of a
right in the public is to decrease the actual potentcy of the accused's
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protection as he may only waive his own and not the public's right. The
guarantee becomes affirmative only.
Although much languaie can be found affirming the right of the
public to be present, State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 255, 156 Pac. 1080
(1916), State v. Hasey, supra, Colletti v. State, 12 Ohio App. 104
(1919), suits by spectators have been understandably rare. State V. Copp,
15 N.H. 212 (1844)-expulsion of spectator justified on ground of his
being unruly, Williamson v. Lucy, 29 At. 943, (1893)--spectator not
allowed damages against the excluding justice. And until the two cases
under discussion, the press, if excluded, has also remained silent. Ordi-
narily, of course, the press has not been excluded except for personal mis-
conduct. 6 TEMP. L. Q. 391 (1949), supra. Even in jurisdictions taking
a less vigorous view of the public trial guarantee exclusion of the press has
only occurred incidental to exclusion of all spectators and no specific men-
tion of the press has been made. Robertson v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 60 So.
118 (1912). But cf. People v. Hall, supra. Moreover, some jurisdictions
have argued further that the presence of the press should be especially
favored as tending to make the trial more public than the presence of idle
spectators. Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918). Al-
though opinions differ as to the merits of permitting the press to "stand-in"
for the public, certainly no court before U.P. Associations v. Valente,
supra has gone so far as to affirmatively exclude the press. See CRoss, THE
PEOPLE's RIGHT TO KNOW, 155-79 (1953), 35 MicH. L. REV. 476
(1937). Until U.P. Associations v. Valente, stpra, however, the courts
had not been looking at the right of the press to be present but only at
the right of the accused to have the press present. When the question
asked is the public's right to be present, the basic split between the courts
as to the scope of the public trial guarantee inevitably produces different
answers.
Although the New York court in People v. Jelke, supra has taken
a long step away from the narrowed view of the right of the accused in
People v. Hall, it still cannot bring itself to recognize a similar right in
the public. However the vigorous dissent of Froessel, J. and the con-
curring opinion of Desmond, J. may hint at a future about face in New
York. But Ohio with its more exacting approach to the public trial
guarantee has now clearly recognized that the public, albeit the press,
has as important a stake in the public trial as the accused.
Mildred M. Mangum
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